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COMMISSION  COMMUNICATION  TO  THE  COUNCIL 
THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  MONETARY  SYSTEM 
AND 
DRAFT  COUNCIL  RESOLUTION 
COM(82)  133 final Consideration of  the  system's  future  began  in May  1979B  The  subject  was  taken 
up  by  the  Commission  in close  consultation  with  the  Mon~tary Committee 
and  the  Committee  of  Governors~ The  discussions  took  into  consideration  and 
were  modified  by  developments  in the  Community!s  economic  situation and  by 
upheavals  in  the  international  environment.  On  several  occasions  there  were 
Council  declarations  on  the  subject  and  in  March  1980,  the  Commission  presented 
the  European  Council  with  a  report  on  the  European  Monetary  Fund~ 
At  its meeting  on  15  February  1982,  at  the  end  of  a·wide-ra~gin~ debate,  the 
Council  found  that  a  numbe1·  of  measures  could  be  taken to develop  the  EMS 
in  the  following  four  areas  :  improving  the  system's  mechanisms,  opening  up 
the  EMS  to  the exterior,  promoting  the private  use  of  the  ECU  and  reinforcing 
convergence.  On  this  occasion~  the  Council  took  note of  the  Commission's 
intention to  put  forward  specific  proposals_  in good  time  for  its meeting 
on  15  March" 
The  present  communication  is  in  response  to that  undertaking.  In it, the 
Commission  proposes  the adoption  of  a  group  of  measures  to  consolidate  and 
develop  the  system;  it insists on  their  importance  by  recalling  the actual 
words  of  the  Foreword  to  the draft  Fifth  Medium-term  Economic  Policy Programme 
''With  the  European  Monetary  System,  the  Community  has  embarked  on  an  ambitious, 
albeit  gradualist.venture  aimed  at  ~tabilization and  convergence.  The  contri-
bution made  by  the  system  - greater  certainty  in  economic  activity,  a  strong 
incentive  to  keep  the  key  economicaggregates in balance,  a  stimulus  to  policy 
convergence  and  the  added  weight  it  gives  to  Europe  in  international  monetary 
cooperation - should  be  a  major  factor  in the  success  of  the  strategy set  out 
in the  fifth  programme".  In other  words,  the  Commission  considers  its proposed 
measures fordeveloping  the  system  to  be  a  necessary and  realistic step towards 
the  institutional  and  f·inal.phase,  which  is still the -ultimate objective of 
the  European  monetary edifice. The  purpose  of  the  system,  clearly  defined  when  it  was  Launched,  is  to 
establish  "closer  monetary  cooperation  Leading  to  a  zone  of  monetary 
stability  in  Europe''.  Three  years  of  cooperation  has  shown  that  the  EMS 
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has  succeeded  in  stabilizing  the  exchange  rate  relationships  of  the 
participating  currencies,  whereas  the  exchange  rates  of  the  major  third 
currencies  (the  dollar  and  the  yen)  and  of  the  non-parti~ipating  Community 
currencies  have  been  very  unstable.  Altogether,  five  realignments  of  central 
r~tes  have  taken  place,  but  two  of  them  have  involved  one  currency  only; 
all  have  been  made  by  mutual  agreement  inc9rderly  market  conditions,  on  the 
basis  of  a  common  proced1Jre  ~hich  has  avoided  competitive  devaluations. 
Throughout  these  three  years,  exchange  rate~management  has  drawn  heavily 
on  the  possibilities offet·ed  by  the  system
1 s.  exchange  rate  and  inten;ention 
mechanism;  national  monetary  policies  have  been  more  cLosely  coordinated 
than  before  and  generally  adapted  to  the  requirements  of  the  system,  even 
though  hindered  by  the  steep  rise  in  US  interest  rates,  ~hich  Led  to  a 
leveL  of  inte~est  rates  in  Europe  incompatible  with  the  Low  economic  acti-
vity  and  the  scale  of  unernploymer't"  The  system  however·,  has  not  ted  to  a 
sufficient  convergence  of  inflation  rates  :  from  1979  to  1981,  the  inflation 
rate  average  rose,  and  the  spread  widened  under  the  combined  impact  of  the 
second  oil  shock,  the  soaring  dollar  and  insufficient  internal  discipline 
as  regards  costs  and  public  finance" 
The  successes  attributable  to  the  EMS  are  therefore  fragile,  and  the 
object  of  the  Commission  proposaLs  is to  strengthen  and  consolidate  the 
system  from  within  so  that  its  contribution to stability and  its ability 
to  resist  outside  shocks  are  increased. 
The  following  proposals,which  are  expressed  in  a  text  based  on  the  format 
of  the  resolution of  5  December  1978  on  the  establishment  of the  EMS  do  not 
impinge  on  the  responsibilities  of  the  various  Member  States  over  their 
monetary  policies.  Their  implementation  will  stimulate  the  system  towards 
its objectives  and  increase  its  contribution  towards  improving  the  general 
-
economic  situation  in  Europe.  The  proposals  respect  the  existing  institut-
ional  framework  and  form  a  balanced  whole,  both  from  the  view  point  of 
creditors'  and  debtors
1  rights  and  obligations  and  of  the  elements  of 
sol~darity and  strictness  on  which  the  system  has  been  based.  Further,  as 
demonstrated  by  the  work  undertaken  in  close  consultation  with  the  competant 
Committee,  their  adoption  is  technically possible. 
.  .. A.  THE  ECU 
The  role  of  the  official  ECU  as  the  very  centre  of  the  system  should  be 
reinforced.  Also  the  current  extension of  the  private  use  of  the  ECU 
should  be  facilitated  and  organized. 
a)  ECU  creation  and  use  in  the  system 
The  monetary  nature  of  the  ECU  flows  from  its characteristics  concerning 
method  cf  issue,  convertibility  and  acceptabitity. 
In  this  respect  the  present  system  is  less  than  satisfactory.  Experience 
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has  proved  the  method  of  issuing  the  ECU  not  to  be  fuLI.y  rational,  and  its 
convertibility  has  remained  embryonic.  Thus  the  Limits  imposed  on  its ac-
ceptability  have,  somewhat  paradoxicaLLy,  looked  like  a  protective measure. 
The  perspective  must  be  reversed,  so  that  it  conforms  with  the  role  planned 
for  the  ECU  in  the  EMS.  The  widest  acceptability  for  the  ECU  must  be  sought, 
and  the  corollary  must  be  some  degree  of  control  over  the  process  of  creating 
ECU  and  the  organization of  arrangements  for  mobilizing  it. 
The  creation of  ECU  against  transfers  of  reserves  has  in  fact  been  potentially 
inflationary  :  as  a  resuCt  of  the  qLJarterly  swpas,  the  27  billion  ECU  created 
in  March  1979  became  almost  50  billion  in  April  1981,  the  figure  has  now 
fallen  to  42  billion.  Although  these  variations  are  primarily  linked  to  the 
variations  in  the  price  of  gold,  the  volume  of  ECU  issued  should  be  divorced 
from  the  two  widely  fluctuating  variables,  the  price  of  gold  ~nd the  dollar 
exchange  rate,  so  that  ECU  creation  can  be  controlled.  At  present,  at  each 
quarterly  swap  renewal,  volume  adjustments  are  made  to take  account  of  the 
variations  in  reserves  held  by  each  central  bank,  and  value  adjustments  are 
made  to  take  account  of the  variations  in the  ECU  price  of  the  assets 
transferred.  An  amended  method  would  be  to-control  ECU  creation  by  retaining 
the  same  volume  adjustments,  but  by  applying  the  value  adjustments  to  the 
quantities of  gold  and  dollars  transferred  to  the  EMCF  by  the  central  banks, 
instead  of  to  the  amount  of  ECU. 
Another  Less  satisfactory possibility to  dampen  the  effects of erratic  gold 
price  movements  on  t~e quantity  ECU  would  be  to  Lengthen  the  reference period 
used  to  calculate  the  average  gold  price  from  six  months  to  two  years.  This 
would  however  entail  the  disadvantage  of  a  difference  between  the  pries  of 
gold  on  the  market  and  that  use  within  the  system.· With  the  inflationary  danger  involved  in  the  present  method  of  ECU  creation 
eliminated,  the  use  of  the  ECU  should  be  encouraged.  The  abolition  of  the 
ECU 1 s  present  acceptance  Limit  for  settlement  of  operations  covered  by  the 
very  short-term  financing  would  enable  the  debtor  to  clear  his  debt  in  fuLL 
by  using  ECU.  In  return,  the  creditor  should  receive  a  higher  reffiuneration 
on  his  net  ECU  position  Cthe  rate  of  interest  whould  be  set  by 
the  governors  of  the  central  banks  at  a  level  derived  from  the  market  Levels) 
and  be  authorized  to  mobilize  a  net  ECU  credit  position  beyond  50%  of  its 
allocation;  on  the  understanding  that  this  mobili2ation  possibility  would 
not  be  used  for- the  sole  purpose  of  changing  the  con,position  cf  its  reserves. 
The  above  modifications  to  the  existing  rules  together  with  those  proposed 
concerning  intra-marginal  interventions  (see  point  C  (d)  below)  make  up,  in 
the  Commission's  view,a  balanced  package  wh·!ch  would  ensure  a  Larger  circula-
tion  for  the  ECU  I·JhHe  respecting  the  interests of  both  debtors  and  creditors. 
b)  Private  use  of  the  ECU 
Alongside  the official  ECU  circuit  and  unconnected  with  it, a  private  ECU 
circuit  is  now  developing.  It  is  natural  f6r  operators  and  markets  to  be 
interested  in  the  monetary  expression  of  a  vast  economic  area  in  the  process 
of  integration.  The  Community  should  take  care  of  its  monetary  image;  it 
should  not  only  promote,  but  also  monitor,  and  even  guide  this  expanding 
private  use  of  the  ECU.  Whence  the  importa~ce of  proposals  designed  to  sup-
plement  the existing  provisions  and  to  encourage  and  control  the  use  of  the 
ECU  on  the  markets. 
It is  important  to  Lay  do~tm  a  sort  of  ''ECU  trademark"  so  that  the  term  and 
the  instrurnE-~nt  "ECU"  is  used  correctLy  by  the  markets.  The  necessary  Community 
legislation  shouLd  there·fore  be  adopted  to  protect  the  ECU  "trademark"  and 
to  define  it.  Such  legislation  would  also  have  to  set  out  the  rules  for  its 
use,  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  ECU  is  not  deflected  thus,  for  example, 
prohibiting  the  attaching  of  an  indexation  clause  to  an  ECU-denominated 
pecuniary  liabiL'ity  would  ensur·e  that  the  ECU  remained  the  instnJment  o·f 
stability  which  is  its purpose.  In  this  way  the  wider  private  use  of  the 
ECU  wouLd  be  solidly  based. 5  -
The  various  Community  institutions  and  the  EIB  would  have  to  promote  the 
widest  possible  use  of  the  ECU  for  their  accounting  and  their operations. 
Greater  use  of  the  ECU  by  the  various  Community  institutions  would 
strengthen  the  ECU's  role  on  the  markets. 
Other  steps  should  be  taken  to  promote  the  wider  use  of  the  ECU  and  to 
make  it  a  factor  in  the  integration of  the  financial  markets  in  Europe. 
First,  the  discriminations  currently  applaying  to  the  ECU  in  national 
regulations  should  be  removed  (being  neither  a  national  nor  a  foreign  currency, 
it  is  subject  to  any  regulation  applying  to  eithe~). The  ECU  should  be  given 
the  status of  a  fo~'ign currency,  a  privileged  on.e.  The  principle  of  free 
movement  within  the  Community  of  ECU-denominated  capital  should  also  be 
established.  Finally  the  EMCF  should  be  empowered  ~o monitor  ECU  operations 
and  issues. 
B.  CONVERGENCE 
On  an  annual  average  over  the  Last  three  years,  and  expressed  in  national 
currencies,  moverr-=nts  of  costs  and  prices in the  countries  participating  in 
the  EMS  have  diverged  substantialy  consumer  price  rises  range  from  5.6%  to 
16.3%  and  variations  in the  relative  unit  costs  of  Labour  range  from  - 14.5% 
to  +  32.7%.  What  is  more,  the  deviations  from  the  mean  are  increasing.  It  is 
true  that  these  movements  would  have  been  even  more  unfavourable  without  the 
EMS,  but  the  persistence  of  these  divergences  impe,ri Ls  the  very  nature  of the 
system.  The  measures  to  strengthen  the  system  ~auld be  useless  if they 
too  did  n6t  contribute  to  the  convergence  of  eco0omic  and  monetary  policies. 6  -
ALL  dimensions  of  economic  pol.icy  should  be  considered  from  the  view-point, 
of  their  contribution  to  convergence  towards  stability.  It  is  clearly  a  long 
and  difficult  exercise.  This  goal  should  always  be  borne  in  mind  when  economic 
policies  are  formulated.  Some  concrete  decisions  should  to  be  taken  at 
Community  Level  and  be  implemented  rapidly.  The  main  objective  whould  be  to 
arrange  for  policies  to  be  concerted  more  actively  : 
a)  by  the  reguLar  discussion  of  the  nationil  intermediate  monetary  policy 
targets,  and  the  level  of  interest  rates~  in  relation  to  their  compatibi-
Lity  with  the  economic  policy objectives pursued ·in  ~ammon,  without  however 
affecting  essential  national  responsibilities expecially  those  of  the 
central  banks; 
b)  by  enumerating  the  economic  and  monetary  policy  measures  and  instruments 
which  are  incompatible  with  the  proper  functioning  of  the  EMS,  the  use 
of  these  should  be  avoided; 
c)  by  establishing  the  principle  of  the  free  movement  of  ECU-denominated 
capital,  and  by  reconsidering  the  restrictions  on  movements  of  capital 
currently  authorized  under  safeguard  clauses; 
d)  by  impr·oving  the  application  of  their  economic  policies  by  Member  States. 
The  results  and  means  of  these  will  be  assessed  by  reference  to  a  set  of 
comparative  indicators  and  to  objectives  laid  down  by  common  agreement; 
in  the  event  of  significant  difference  between  these,  the  Commission 
should  make  full  use  of  the  existing  consultation  and  recommendation 
procedures. 
e)  by  establishing a  mutual information  and  monitoring  procedure  on  the 
balance  of  payments  situation  and  the external  indebtedness  of  the  Member 
States;  in  this  context,  an  assessment  could  be  made  of  the  desirability 
of  early  recourse  to  Community  financing. C.  EXTERNAL  RELATIONS  OF  THE  SYSTEM 
In  the  field  of  international  monetary  relations,  the  Community  Lacks 
the  organization  needed  for  it  to  play  the  roLe  asked  of  it  as  one  of 
the  poles  of  the  developing  multiple  reserve  currency  system.  As  a 
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result;  it  is  handicapped  in  the  dialogue  with  the  authorities  responsible 
for  the  major  third  currencies,  the dollar  and  the  yen,  at  a  time  when 
such  a  dialogue  is  essential  in  order  to  promote  the orderly  evolution of 
the  international  monetary  system. 
The  cohesion  of  the  system  might  not  withstand  the  repetition  of  shocks 
comparable  to  those  caused,in the  Last  two  years,  by  the  sudden  and  erratic 
changes  in  US  interest  rates  (which  have  doubled)  and  the dollar  exchange 
rate  (which  has  appreciated  by  over  50%  against  the major  European  currencies). 
Circumstances  demand  a  common  attitude to  third  ~urrencies - particula~Ly 
the dollar  - and  an  expression  of  this  by  Community  bodies. 
Actions  in  four  areas  could  be  foreseen 
a)  Reinforcing  the  regular  consultations  should. be  proposed  to  the  US 
and  Japanese authorities.  The  various  Community  bodies  (Council,  Commision 
and  specialist  committees)  should  take  part  in  these  consultations. 
These  would  provide·a  regular  forum,  with  periodicity  to  be  decided,for 
an  exchange  of  views  on  financial  and  monetary  problems  of  common  interest. 
The  procedure  should  ~lso be  able  to  be  activated  when  the  situation  on 
the  foreign  exchange  market  appeared  to  be  unrelated  to  the  underlying 
economic  data  - i.e.  manifestly  outside  the  Limits  that  economic  likelihood 
would  suggest  or  when  interest  rate differentials  caused  excessive  and 
undesirable  strains  on  the  Community's  money  and  financial  markets. 8  -
b)  The  community  monetary  authorities  should  encourage  the  American  and 
Japanese  monetary  authorities  to  participate  in  meaningful  cooperation 
on  exchange  and  interest  rates.  The  US  authorities  in  particular  should 
be  invited  to  abandon  their  Laisser-aller  exchange  rate  and 
interest  rate policy.  Also  discussions  with  the  US  authorities  should 
be  started  with  a  vie~ to  replacing  the  existing  network  of  swaps 
between  certain  Community  central  banks  ~nd  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
New  York  by  a  single  credit  Line  between  the  latter  and  the  EMCF.  This 
would  provide  tangible  evidence  of  European  dete~mination to  avoid 
appearing  disunited  from  the  United  States  point  of  view. 
c)  The  coordination  of  Community  central  banks
1  interventions  in  third 
currencies  should  be  ~mproved.  The  central  banks  should  make  regular 
and  frequent  common  assessments  of  the  ECU's  exchange  relationships, 
paying  regard to  the  average  level  of  interest  rates  desirable  in  the 
Community.  Their  intervention  policy  should  be  based  on  this  assessment. 
d)  With  the  same  objective  in  view,  it  is  important  to  organize  the  use 
of  Community  currencies  in  intra-marginal  interventions.  At  present,  a 
central  bank
1 s  use  of  a  Community  currency  {or  intervention  inside  the 
margins  is  subject  to  the  good  will  of  the  central  bank  whose  currency 
is  requested.  Interventions  are  instead  made  in  dollars  and  this  often 
has  the  effect  of  emphasizing  an  undesired  movement  of  the  U~  currency 
or  of  undermining  the  coherence  of  the participating  central  banks' 
attitudes  towards  that  currency.  Alternatively,  if  no  intervention  is 
made  inside  the  marginsp  the  currency  under  threat  slides  untiL  it 
reaches  its bilateral  margin,  at  which  point  the  intervention  amounts 
may  be  far  greater  than  those  that  would  earLier  have  been  necessary 
to  reverse  the trend. The  use  of  Commun).ky  currencies  for  intra-marginal  interventions  would 
conform  to  the  spirit  of  the  system  if it  were  specified that  a  cent~al 
bank  intervening  inside the  margins  was  presumed  to  be  able  to  do  so  in 
Community  currencies  with  access  to  the  very  short-term  financing  when 
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its  currency  crossed  the  divergence  threshold  (Lowered  to  50%  for  wider 
band  currencies)  or  when  the  difference of  its bilateral  rate  vis-~-vis 
another  participant  was  more  than  85%  of  the  permitted  fluctuatioa margin. 
The  central  banks  of  ~urrencies used  for  interventions  would  for  their part 
have  the  right of refusing  the  continued  use  of  their  currencies  if such 
use  were  causing  problems  for  their  internal  monetary  policy.  Nevertheless, 
the  dollar  would  continue to  be  used  for  intra-marginal  interventions  in 
cases  where,  by  use  of  this  currency,  the  cohesion  of  the  EMS  could  be 
maintained  and,  at  the  same  time,  an  undesirable  movement  of  the  dollar  in 
relation  to  the  EMS  co~l~ be  acted  upon. 
Determined  action  in  line  with  the  above  could  allow  the  Community  the 
degree  of  autonomy  necessary  for  it to .be  able  to  react,in a  unified and 
coherent  way,to  tensions  from  the  outside  which  have  a  Large  and  excessive 
effect  on  European  interest  rates. 
The  EMS  is  at  present  a  closed  system  in  which  only  the  central  banks 
of  certain  Member  States participate,  whereas  the  Community  is  open  to 
the  outside  world.  Opening 'it to  thirq countries  in  the  spirit  of  the 
European  Council  of  Brusse(s  andgiving:them  access  to  ECU  would  extend 
the  system's  zone  of  stability and  in~rease the possibilities  for  using 
and  mobilizing  ECU. 
Central  banks  of  countries  which  seek  to  have.  special  economic  and  financial 
ties  with  the  European  Communities  shoyld  be  authorized  to  acquire  ECU 
freely  from  the participating  central  banks,and  the  EMCF  should  be  empowered. 
to  create  ECU  for  them  on  ~he  same  conditions as  those  for  the  participants, 
i.e.  against  reserve  ~ransfers in the  form  of  swaps.  But  first,  agreements 
would  have  to  be  concluded  specifying  the  te~ms and  conditions  for  acquiring, 
mobilizing  and  restituting,ECUo 
*, 
*  * The  adoption  of  :he  measures  pro~osed above  to  develop,  s:rengt~e~  a~d 
consolidate  the  ~~S  is  technically  feasible.  Wnile  t~P~  r·e~~ect  the 
institutional  framew0rk,  they  represent  a  necessar!  st0p  ~cr~ar~  far  the 
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syst~m.  In  devising  them,  care  has  b~en taken  to  ~reserve the  ba~ancc 
betw~en the  principles  of  stricr~e~s  and  soLiJarity  in~cr~~t  in  the  sy~:e~, DRAFT  COUNCIL  RESOLUTION 
Develon~ent of  the  European  Monetary  System 1.  Introduction 
1.1.  At  the  Council  meeting  of  15  March  1982,  the  ministers  of  economics  and 
financial  affairs  of  the  Member  States  examined  the  Commission's  commu-
nication  on  strengthening  of  the  European  Monetary  System  and  Listened 
to  reports  on  this  subject  from  the  chairmen  of  the  Monetary  Committee 
and  Committee  of  Central  Bank  Governors. 
1.2.  The  Council  confirms  its determination  to  continue  strengthening  the 
system  until  its transition to  the  institutional  stage  at  the  appropriate 
time.  It  agreed  to  keep  under  review  the  word  in  the  transition  to  the 
final  stage  of  the  system  and  the  creation of  the  European  Monetary  Fund 
already  undertaken  by  the  Commission  and  the  competent  committees. 
1.3.  The  Council  is  determined  to  more  forward  towards  establishing  the  final 
phase  of  the  system  by  adopting  the  following  provisions  and  measures. 
2.  The  ECU 
2.1.1.  At  the  next  quarterly  swap,  the  base  volume  of  ECU  will  be  set  at 
40  (1)  billion.  This  base  volume  will  remain  until  the  end  of  the 
present  period  of  swaps. 
During  this period,  quarterly value  adjustments  will  relate  to  the 
quantities of  gcrld  and  dollars  transferred  to  the  EMCF  by  the  central 
banks. ·volume  adjustment  will  continue  to  be  made  according  to  the 
existing  system. 
A new  base  volume  will  be  fixed  when  the  decision  is to  be  taken  on 
the  renewal  of  the  swap  system  {15  March  1983). 
Alternatively,  the  reference  period  to  be .used  for  gold  valuation will 
be  extended  to  two  years. 
"o••/•~• 
(1)  This  number  corresponds approximatelyto  the  amount  of  ECU  which  would  be 
created  if  the  existing  rules  were  applied  at  the  start of  the  next  swap 
period  (April  1982). - 2  -
2.1.2.  The  acceptance  Limit  on  ECU  is  raised  to 100  %. 
2.1.3.  The  remuneration  of  ECU  net  credit positions  will  be  fixed  by  the 
Central  Bank  Governors  on  the  basis of  market  exchange  rates. 
2.1.4.  Any  participant  whose  net  positive  pos1tion  has  exceeded  50% of  its 
ECU  allocation  may,  on  demand,  mobilize  these  ECU  against  dollars 
for  the  duration  of  the  existing  ~eriod of  swaps.  Mobilization  should 
not  be  done  for  the  sole  purpose  of  changing  the  composition  of  re-
serves. 
2.2.1.  The  ECU  will  be  the  subject  of  a  basic  Community  text  which  will  lay 
down  iti characteristics  and  the  way  in  which  it is  used. 
2.2.2.  The  ECU  will  have  the  status  of  a  foreign  currency  in all  Member 
States.-N~ional monetary  authorities  will  permit  the  financial  ins-
titutions  under  their  control  to  open  actounts  and  carry out  opera-
tions  in  ECU.  ECU  bond  issues  will  be  th~ subject  of  a  Community  mutual 
information  procedur~. 
2.2.3.  Indexation  clauses  wilL  not  be  permitted  to  apply,  apart  from  by 
exception,  to  claims,  values  or prices  expressed  in  ECU. 
2.2.4.  The  various  Community  institutiohs,  and  the  EIB  will  be  invited to  do 
the  same,  shall,  with  the  active  collaboration of  the  Member  States, 
undertake  to  p~omote the  widest  possible  use  of  the  ECU  in  the  a~eas 
for  which  they  are  responsible;  in  particular  : 
-the ECU  will  b~ progressively  used  for  borrowing  and  Lending  opera-
tions  as  far  as  is  compatible  with  its sound  establishment  on  the 
financial  markets,  the  object; in  view :being  for  it to  account  for  a 
similar proportion of  such  operatio~s as  do  those  national  curren-
'  cies  which  are  most  used; 
Community  institutions 0  accou~ts in national  currencies will,  in 
principle,  be  rep~aced by  accounts  in  ECU; - 3  -
-the financiaL  rights  and  obligations  of  these  institutions will, 
as  far  as  possible,  be  denominated  and  settled  in  ECU. 
3.  Measures  to  develop  convergence 
3.1.  The  actual  conduct  of  the  economic  policies of  Member  States  must  be 
assessed,  as  regards  its  results  and  its methods,  by  reference  to  the 
objectives  Laid  down  by  common  agreement.  The  Commission  is  invited,  in 
this  context,  to  make  full  use  of  the  existing  consultation  and  recommen-
dation  procedure. 
3.2.  The  Council  of  Ministers  ECO/FIN  will  regular~y discuss,on  the  basis  of 
a  report  by  the  Monetary  Committee  and  the  tommittee  of  Governors,  the 
intermediate  monetary  targets  and  the  Level  of  interest  rates  in  the 
Community  countries  in  the  Light  of  their  compatibility  with  the  objec-
tives  of  economic  policies.  Where  the  intermediate  monetary  targets  are 
concerned,  the  discussion  will  take  pl8ce  at  least  once  a  year  during  the 
fourth  quarter. 
3.3.  Measures  which  are  incompatible  with  the  proper  functioning  of  the  EMS 
must  be  avoided.  The  Council  wilL,  on  a  pr·oposal  of  the  Commission, 
drau  up  a  list  of  meas0res  which  impede  current  transactions;  im-
plementation  of  such  measures  will  be  prohibited,  in  the  ab~ence of  a 
decision  made  at  the  Community  level  and  fot·  ~  Limited  period. 
3.4.  Except  for  derogations  granted  under  the  Treaty,  there  will  be  free 
movement  of  ECU  denominated  capitalu  Liberalization of  other  capital 
movements  currently  subject  to  restrictionswill  be  sought  through  an 
examination  of  the  restr·lct·ions  in  force" 
3.5.  A mutual  information  and  monitoring  procedure  will  be  established  on  the_ 
balance  of  payments  situation  and  the  external  indebtedness  of  the  Mem-
ber  States,  in  Line  with  the  suggesti6ns  of  ~he Monetary  Committee  of 
October  1980.  Early  use  of  Community  credit  ~ill  be  encouraged  when  it 
is  complementary  to  a  policy  aimed  at  external  balance. 4 ..  Organization of  the  exterior aspects  of  the  system 
4.1.  The  competent  Commun~ty  institutio~s will  propose  to.the  US  aMd  Japan~se 
authorities that  thei~ regular discussions on  monetary  problems  of  . 
common  interest  should  be  reinforced.  The~e consultations  should  also 
take  place  when  the  foreign  exchange  market  a·ppears  to~ be  unrelated 
to  the  underlying. econ~mic date- :i.e.  where  rates  are  obviously out-
side  the  limits that  economic  likelihood would  suggest - or  when  inte-
rest  rate differentials cause  excessiv~ and  undesirable strains on  .  . 
·  ··the  Community's  money  and  financial  markets  .. 
4.2  ..  The  Europ,an  authori~ies will  continue to  request  the  United  States to 
abandon  the principle of  not  intervening on  the  foreign  exchange  mar-
kets.Cooperation with  Community  central  banks  will  be  facilitated by 
the  establishment of'a single credit  line between  the  FED  and  the  EMCF. 
..  : i  : 
4.3  ..  Coordination of  Community  central  banks•':intervent~ons  in third curren-
cies  wi l.l be  increased  ..  Interventions  wH·l  be  based  on  a  common  assess-
ment  of  the  ECU 0s  exchange  relationship~·~nd bearing  in mind  the 
. average  level  of  interest  rates desirable·· in the  Communi'ty. 
4e4u  When  a  currency crosses  its divergence  threshold  (lower~d to 50  % for 
wider  band  currencies)  or  when  t~e difference of  its bilateral  rate 
is more  than  85  % of  the  maximum  permitted  fluctuation margin  against 
another participating  currency,  ihe  central  bank  of  the  currency  in ques-
ticn is  pr~sumed to be  able to iritervene:in Community  currency and  to  ha~e 
access  t~ the very •hort-term  firiancing~ 1 The issuing central  banks  of 
currencies  used  for  .intervention~ have  the possibility to  refusing the 
continuPd  use  of  their"currency if thi•.causes  problems  for  their 
internal monetary  po~icy·.  Nevertheless,  -~he  dollar will  continue to  .  .  ..  .  l  • 
be  used :for  intra-ma~ginal  inte~ventiori~ :in  cases where,  by  use  of 
•••  !._ •• ..  5  -
this  currency,  the  cbhesion of  the  E~S can  ~e maini&ined- and,  at  the 
same  time,  an  undesirable  movement  of  the  dollar  in  relation to  the 
EMS  can  be  acted  upona 
4~5o  The  central  banks  of  countries  which  seek  to  have  special  economic 
and  financial  ties with  the  European  Communities  will  be  able  to obtain 
ECU,  either  by  acquiring  them  fro~ the  P<lf.ticipating  central  banks,  or 
against  transfers of  reserves,  in the  form  of  swaps,  from  the  EMCFa 
So  Further  procedure 
Sa1o  So  as  to  implement  the  provisions  of  point  2a2.  above,  the  Council 
notes  the  Commission's  intention  to  submit,to  the  extent  this is neces-
sary,  the  appropriate  modificatio~s to  re~ulation  CCEE)  n°  3180/78. 
5~2a  The  Co~ncil  invites  the  Central  Banks  to  modify their  agreement  of 
13  March  1979  laying  down  the  Operating  procedures  for  the  European 
Monetary-System to take  account  of  point~-2.1~ 4.4 and  4.5  above. 
5.3.  The  Council  invites the  Commission,  in  close  cooperation  with  the 
Monetary  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  Governors,  to  report  in  time 
'  for  its July meeting  ~n the  implementation of  the  measures  and  proce-
dures  set out  in paragraphs  3  and  4  aboven 